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Abstract 
 
A common feature of contemporary political systems is the increasing amount 
of delegation from governments to non-majoritarian institutions. 
Governments may decide to delegate authority to such institutions for 
reasons relating to credible commitments, political uncertainty, and policy 
complexity. This article focuses on Independent Administrative Authorities 
(Autorités administratives indépendantes) in France. We demonstrate that these 
institutions enjoy varying degree of independence. We find that the degree of 
independence varies as a function of two factors: the need to make a credible 
commitment in areas subject to market opening and the complexity of policy 
in particular areas. 
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Credible commitment, political uncertainty, or policy complexity? 
Explaining variations in the independence of non-majoritarian institutions 
in France 
 
A common feature of contemporary political systems is the increasing amount 
of delegation from governments to non-majoritarian institutions, or 
‘governmental entities that (a) possess and exercise some grant of specialised 
public authority, separate from that of other institutions, but (b) are neither 
directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials’.i 
These institutions include courts, central banks, regulatory authorities, quasi-
government agencies and so forth. There are various reasons why 
governments may decide to delegate their authority in this way. For example, 
they may want to make a credible commitment in order to pursue certain 
policy objectives more efficiently. Alternatively, in a context of political 
uncertainty, they may choose to delegate power and insulate their policies 
from reforms by political opponents. Equally, they may need to delegate 
decision making to technical experts in areas of policy complexity. 
 This article asks the following question: why does the degree of 
independence vary from one non-majoritarian institution to another? This 
question is addressed by focusing on the delegation of authority from 
governments to so-called Independent Administrative Authorities (Autorités 
administratives indépendantes - AAIs) in France. In order to explore the research 
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question, a number of hypotheses were derived from the existing literature on 
delegation. These hypotheses centred on motivations relating to credible 
commitments, political uncertainty and policy complexity. Then, an index of 
independence was constructed and the degree of independence of each AAI 
was calculated. This served as the dependent variable. In turn, various 
explanatory variables were identified and a multiple regression was carried 
out. The results showed that the degree of AAI independence varied as a 
function of two factors: the need to make a credible commitment in areas 
subject to market opening and the complexity of policy in particular areas. By 
contrast, the results also showed that the degree of independence was not 
related to the need to make a credible commitment as a function of the 
numbers of veto players in the system or as a response to the problem of 
political uncertainty. 
These findings are significant in a number of ways. Firstly, whereas the 
literature often suggests that the number of veto players and the degree of 
political uncertainty is instrumental in the decision to delegate, we find that 
this is not so in the case of AAIs. This casts doubt on the generalizability of 
such arguments. Secondly, up to now the academic literature has tended to 
focus on the creation of non-majoritarian institutions and the reasons why 
they are established in some areas rather than others. In our study, we 
examine institutions that already exist, but that vary in terms of the degree of 
independence that has been granted to them. Thus, we suggest that the 
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existing literature can be extended to include studies of existing agencies, 
rather than simply focusing on the issue of whether or not an act of delegation 
has taken place. 
There are three main parts to the article. The first part briefly outlines 
the existing literature on delegation and identifies the hypotheses to be tested. 
The second part describes the set of AAIs in France and measures the degree 
of independence that each institution enjoys. The third part tests the 
hypotheses and presents the findings of the multiple regression model. There 
is a brief conclusion. 
 
DELEGATION TO NON-MAJORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS 
 
There is an increasingly large body of work on delegation. The earliest studies 
of this sort focused overwhelmingly on the US and the relationship between 
Congress and executive agencies. Here, the main issue was whether, by 
delegating, Congress had abdicated power to such agencies or whether it was 
still able to control their actions.ii More recently, studies of the US have shifted 
the emphasis somewhat, focusing on the design of legislation or the choices of 
political actors at the delegation stage.iii In a European context, attention has 
also focused on the issue of government control. Here, the usual assumption 
is that delegation to non-majoritarian institutions has reduced the decision-
making capacity of national governments. So, for example, it has been argued 
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that delegation has ‘reconfigured the architecture of the state and the EU …’iv 
and that non-majoritarian institutions ‘have become powerful participants in 
policy making and may now constitute a ‘fourth branch of government’ in 
Europe’.v In addition to this work, there is now a growing body of literature 
that has applied the more recent US work to the European policy-making 
process. For example, Majone has explored the various logics of delegation, 
focusing on delegation as a response to the problems of credible commitment 
and fiduciary relations.vi 
This article builds on the more recent US and European work. It 
examines the reasons why political actors delegate different degrees of 
independence to non-majoritarian institutions. In so doing, it focuses on the 
strategic choices of actors at the point of delegation, so avoiding the problem 
of observational equivalence.vii 
 There are various reasons why political actors may decide to delegate 
decision-making authority to non-majoritarian institutions.viii The classic 
reason is that it helps to establish a credible commitment and solve the 
problem of time-inconsistency.ix Here, the basic problem is that while it may 
be rational to do a certain thing at a particular point in time, it may not be 
rational to do it over time. As Kydland and Prescott put it: “We find that a 
discretionary policy for which policymakers select the best action, given the 
current situation, will not typically result in the social objective function being 
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maximised” (1977, pp. 473-74).x Or, as Shepsle states, rather more succinctly: 
‘Discretion is the enemy of optimality, commitment its ally’.xi 
 In the context of non-majoritarian institutions, the literature on credible 
commitments has taken two main forms. Firstly, there is the argument that 
the problem of credible commitment affects some policy areas more than 
others. In particular, it affects sectors that are more internationally 
interdependent, or that have recently been subject to market opening. So, for 
example, the desire to establish a credible commitment is the basic motivation 
behind the decision to create independent central banks. Only by delegating 
authority to such an institution can governments convince the public that they 
are serious about wanting to reduce inflation and, thus, reduce the level of 
inflationary expectations among the public. More generally, it is also the 
motivation behind the decision to establish Independent Regulatory Agencies 
(IRAs) in areas that have recently been the subject of privatisation or market-
opening, such as telecommunications, electricity, transport and so on.xii From 
this work, we can construct the following hypothesis: 
 
H1 The degree of independence granted to non-majoritarian institutions 
will be greater in policy sectors that have been subject to market 
opening 
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 Secondly, there is a further argument that the problem of credible 
commitment is greater when the number of veto players is smaller.xiii In cases 
where there is a very small number of actors, perhaps only a single actor, 
whose agreement is necessary to change the status quo, then the potential for 
policy consistency is reduced. In this case, there is a greater need for 
governments to make a credible commitment in order to address the resulting 
time-inconsistency problem. On the basis of this logic, it can be hypothesized 
that there is an inverse relationship between the number of veto players and 
the degree of independence granted to non-majoritarian institutions. This 
leads to a second hypothesis: 
 
H2 The degree of independence granted to non-majoritarian institutions 
will be greater in cases where the number of veto players is smaller 
 
 Another reason that has been put forward to explain the motivation for 
delegation relates to the problem of political uncertainty. As Moe puts it, 
political actors ‘know that whatever policies and structures they put in place 
today may be subject to the authoritative direction of other actors tomorrow, 
actors with different interests who could undermine or destroy their hard-
won achievements’.xiv This uncertainty may be a function of the process of 
regular electoral competition that, as Horn notes, ‘makes it very likely that the 
current enacting coalition will eventually be replaced by one representing 
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different interests and with quite different policy preferences’.xv Alternatively, 
uncertainty may simply be caused by the standard McKelvey-like situation 
where the preferences of a principal composed of multiple actors shift 
because of majority-rule instability.xvi Whatever the cause, the effect is the 
same. Incumbent political actors have an incentive to transfer power to 
independent institutions. As Moe states: ‘The group’s task in the current 
period … is to build agencies that are difficult for its opponents to gain 
control over later … this often means building agencies that are insulated 
from public authority in general—and thus from formal control by the group 
itself’.xvii Likewise, Horn argues that the legislature is likely ‘to favor a 
regulatory agent that is relatively independent from the incumbent 
legislature’ (1995, p. 53).xviii In this context, we can propose a third hypothesis: 
 
H3 The degree of independence granted to non-majoritarian institutions 
will be greater when the level of political uncertainty is high 
 
 Another reason put forward to explain why political actors delegate 
authority to non-majoritarian institutions is that it resolves problems of 
information asymmetry. In recent years, policy making has become more 
complex. This is not merely because of the growth of government and the 
interaction between issues in seemingly different policy areas, it is also 
because policy making has become more technically complex. In this 
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situation, political actors are at a disadvantage. They require the support of 
policy experts. They do not have the resources or the incentive to develop 
such expertise for themselves. As Thatcher notes: ‘Increased information 
requirements made it more difficult for elected politicians to produce clear 
benefits for voters from their regulatory decisions. Even issues that were more 
directly relevant to voters became increasingly linked to arcane matters that 
were incomprehensible to non-specialists’.xix In other words, highly technical 
policy areas will require the attention of an independent rather than a 
political body. In this context, a fourth hypothesis can be proposed: 
 
H4 The degree of independence granted to non-majoritarian institutions 
will be greater when the level of policy complexity is high 
 
 The rest of this article focuses on the delegation of authority from 
governments to Independent Administrative Authorities in France. France is 
a particularly appropriate country to examine. As noted above, to date, the 
literature on delegation has focused overwhelmingly on the US. The US-
centric studies have produced supposedly generalizable arguments. In this 
context, while in recent times there has been an increasing focus on cross-
national studies, France is an extremely interesting test case. This is because 
France is often considered to be exceptional in comparative terms largely 
because of its commitment to a strong centralized state. Thus, France is a 
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tough test for the literature on delegation. If we find that any of the US-
derived hypotheses are verified, then we can reasonably conclude that the 
theory is strengthened. If not, then either French exceptionalism is alive and 
well or the theory is flawed. 
By the same token, AAIs are particularly appropriate institutions to 
study. To date, the literature on delegation has tended to focus on the decision 
to create institutions. In other words, there is a dichotomous variable: why is 
there an independent institution in some areas rather than others? In our 
study, we focus on a set of institutions that have already been created and 
have varying degrees of independence. Therefore, we are studying a 
continuous variable: why does the degree of independence vary from one 
institution to another? If we find that the theory helps us to answer this 
question, then we will have demonstrated that there is the potential for the 
theory to be extended beyond its usual domain. The next section defines the 
concept of an AAI, identifies the AAIs that can be found in contemporary 
France and measures the independence of each of these institutions. 
 
INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES IN FRANCE 
 
The concept of an Independent Administrative Authority has been present in 
France since 1978 with the creation of the National Commission for 
Information and Civil Liberties.xx All the same, even though AAIs have now 
 12 
been explicitly recognized in law for more than a quarter of century, no 
standard definition of the concept has emerged. Instead, more often than not, 
writers choose to identify what they consider to be the main characteristics of 
such institutions, even if such a description often falls short of a formal 
definition in the strict sense of the term.xxi In this context, the Council of State 
(Conseil d’État), which is the highest court of administrative law in the land, 
has provided the benchmark definition of an AAI. The Council of State 
declared that AAIs are institutions that ‘act on behalf of the State without 
being subordinate to the Government and that, in order to carry out their 
tasks properly, benefit from guarantees which allow them to act with 
complete autonomy, such that their actions may not be influenced or 
sanctioned except by the courts. In order to fulfil this mission, they have 
varied sets of powers which, in some cases, give them the power of 
regulation, individual authorisation, control, injunction, sanction and, indeed, 
even appointment, but which, in other cases, is merely one of influence, even 
if this power is couched in fairly formal terms so that it gives them a genuine 
moral authority’.xxii Even though this definition hardly trips off the tongue, it 
is at least fairly comprehensive and, certainly, it means that AAIs can be 
classified as non-majoritarian institutions.xxiii In terms of the list of such 
institutions, as before, it is reasonable to treat the recent Council of State’s 
report as the definitive study on the topic to date. This report identified 34 
institutions that could be classified as AAIs.xxiv (See Table 1). 
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AAIs come in all shapes and sizes and they operate in many different 
areas.xxv There is a concentration of organisations in the economic and 
financial sectors, including the Banking Commission and the Financial 
Markets Council. There are also a number of organisations that are designed 
to protect citizens from abuse by either public officials or politicians. These 
include the Commission for Access to Administrative Documents, the 
National Commission for the Control of Telephone Tapping and the National 
Commission for Campaign Finance and Political Contributions. That said, the 
set of AAIs is very diverse, ranging from institutions such as the Competition 
Council to the Council for the Prevention of and the Fight against Doping in 
Sport and the National Evaluation Committee for Universities. 
For the purposes of this study, two aspects of the set of AAIs are 
particularly noteworthy. Firstly, they actually exist. We are examining 
institutions that have been set up, but which vary in the degree of decision-
making authority that has been granted to them. Secondly, while the list of 
AAIs does include a number of classic IRAs, including the Higher Council of 
Broadcasting, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, the Electricity 
Regulatory Commissionxxvi  and the Stock Exchange Commission, it includes 
many other types of institutions as well, such as the Opinion Poll 
Commission, the Commission for Consumer Safety and the National Ethical 
Commission for Law and Order. In most of the literature on delegation, 
writers have confined themselves to the study of IRAs and little more. One of 
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the topics we wish to investigate is whether the literature on the motivations 
behind the delegation process can be applied to non-majoritarian institutions 
generally, rather than just a subset of such institutions, namely IRAs alone. 
 Table 1 about here. 
 In order to proceed with the analysis, the first task was to establish the 
degree of independence granted to each AAI, or a measure for the dependent 
variable. To this end, an index of agency independence was constructed.xxvii In 
order to avoid the problem of observational equivalence, it is important to 
focus on the instruments of control that exist in law rather than the post-
delegation behaviour of the agency in question. Thus, the index is based on 
the most up-to-date statutes relating to the institution in question. There are 
two basic elements to the index: indicators relating to the head of the agency 
and the board of managers; and indicators relating to the powers of the 
agency. 
Firstly, eight indicators were identified relating to the head of the 
agency and the governing board. These are: the term of office of the head and 
the agency and the board of managers respectively; the procedure by which 
they are appointed and dismissed; and whether or not their term of office can 
be renewed. For each of these indicators, a range of scores from 0 (no 
independence) to 1 (full independence) was identified. For example, if the 
president’s term of office was less than three years, then a score of 0 was 
assigned because the turnover would be too great for incumbents to gain any 
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independent decision-making authority; if the term was three years, then the 
score was 0.2; four years was 0.4; five years was 0.6; six was 0.8; and eight 
years and over was 1. In terms of appointments, if the head was appointed by 
a single elected representative, then a score of 0 was assigned; by more than 
one elected representative, then 0.25; by a complex mix of elected 
representatives and non-elected actors, 0.5; by one or more non-elected actors, 
0.75; and if the appointment was made by the board of the agency itself, then 
a score of 1 was assigned. In terms of dismissal, if the power to dismiss the 
head was at the appointer’s discretion, then a score of 0 was assigned; no 
specific provisions for dismissal scored 0.33; dismissal only for reasons not 
related to policy scored 0.67; and complete security of tenure scored 1. Finally, 
if the appointment was renewable more than once, then a score of 0 was 
assigned; no specific provisions scored 0.33; a once-off renewal scored 0.67; 
and no renewability scored 1. After all the scores had been assigned, the mean 
of the scores for the head of the agency and the board respectively were 
calculated. The mean of these means was then calculated. This figure is 
referred to as ‘mean 1 appointments’.xxviii 
 In relation to these calculations, a number of points of clarification 
need to be made. Article 13 of the 1958 Constitution indicates that a person 
who is permanently employed in the civil service, such as a member of the 
Council of State or another of the so-called grands corps, has to be appointed to 
another public-sector post, like an AAI, by a decree. Depending on the case, 
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the decree may have to be signed by the President or the Prime Minister or 
both, and it may or may not have to be approved in the Council of Ministers. 
What score should be assigned in this case? For example, if the Vice President 
of the Council of State proposes an appointment, but the proposal has to be 
confirmed by a presidential or prime ministerial decree, should a score of 0 be 
assigned because the decree has been signed by an elected representative or 
should a score of 0.75 be recorded because the nomination has been made by 
a non-elected actor? Here, the latter score was considered more appropriate. 
This is because the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister is merely 
obliged, by law, to issue a decree. Thus, in effect the elected representative has 
not made the appointment. Indeed, even if the proposal were to be rejected by 
either the President or Prime Minister, the Vice President of the Council of 
State would still be able to propose another person who may be equally 
objectionable. Furthermore, it might be added that there is no evidence to 
indicate that either the President or Prime Minister has ever rejected such a 
proposal. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a score of 0.75 is appropriate in 
this case and others like it. 
A similar issue concerns the case where, for example, the Prime 
Minister appoints someone who is recommended by another institution, or 
where the Prime Minister has to choose one person from a list of people 
nominated by such an institution. Again, here, a score of 0 was not considered 
to be appropriate in these cases. This is because, even though, especially in the 
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latter case, the Prime Minister may have a degree of discretion in the 
appointment, it may also be the case that, say, a left-wing Prime Minister is 
faced with four right-wing nominations. Another difficult issue was the case 
where a political appointee to one institution is a member ex officio of another 
institution. Once more, here, a score of 0 was not assigned, but was treated as 
a complex mix and a score of 0.5 was recorded. By contrast, there were two 
problematic cases where for the purposes of this study a score of 0 was 
assigned. The first was where an elected representative is obliged in law to 
choose a ‘suitably-qualified’ candidate. This was assigned a score of 0 
because, for example, a right-wing President has free rein to appoint a 
suitably-qualified right-wing person. The second was where an elected 
representative makes an appointment following the advice of another person 
or institution. Here, it was assumed that any such advice can be freely 
ignored and the elected representative has the right to appoint whomsoever 
s/he chooses. Thus, a score of 0 was appropriate. This was different from the 
case where an elected representative appoints someone who is recommended 
by an another institution because in that case the refusal by, say, a right-wing 
President to accept a left-wing recommendation may simply have the result 
that another left-wing name is recommended by the institution concerned. 
 To illustrate how this element of the index of independence works, let 
us take the example of ART, the telecommunications regulator. The head of 
ART is appointed by the President of the Republic and so scores 0. The board 
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members are appointed by the President of the Republic and by the 
Presidents of both the National Assembly and the Senate. Thus, the 
appointment score for the board is 0.25. The term of office of both the head 
and the board members is six years and so both score 0.8. The terms of the 
head and the board members are non-renewable and so both score 1. 
Moreover, they cannot be dismissed during their term, so both the head and 
the board members score 1 in this respect as well. On the basis of these scores, 
the mean for the head is 0.7, the mean for the board is 0.76, and the overall 
score, the mean 1 appointments, score, is 0.73. 
Secondly, five indicators were identified relating to the powers of the 
AAI in question. These comprized, firstly, the power to give advice, make 
recommendations, or present proposals to the government. Most AAIs had 
this power. However, the Consultative Committee on National Defence 
Confidentiality and the Higher Council of Agence France Press had only this 
power. Secondly, there was the power to hold an official investigation into a 
particular topic, to request that a representative of the body under 
investigation to appear before the AAI, or to make an on-site inspection. A 
number of institutions only had these first two powers. These included the 
Ombudsman, the Commission for Consumer Safety and the Commission for 
Access to Administrative Documents. Thirdly, there was the power to issue a 
decree (règlement). Such a decision may have potentially important 
repercussions. However, usually, it has to be counter-signed by a political 
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representative. Thus, it is a circumscribed power. Fourthly, there was the 
power of appointment, the power to authorize a contract, or approve an 
agreement. For example, the Higher Council for Broadcasting has the power 
to appoint the heads of the public-sector radio and television organisations. 
Equally, ART has the power to issue licences to telecommunications 
operators. Finally, there was the power to impose sanctions or even cease the 
activity of a particular organisation in the area in question. A number of 
institutions enjoyed this power, including the Stock Exchange Commission 
and the Authority for the Control of Airport Noise. In this context, rather than 
trying to weight the relative importance of these powers, each was considered 
to be equally important. Thus, if an AAI enjoyed a certain power, then it was 
given a score of 1. Otherwise, a score of 0 was recorded. The mean of these 
five scores was then calculated. This figure is referred to as ‘mean 2 power’. 
Three institutions had a mean score of 1 in this category: the broadcasting and 
telecommunications regulators and the Stock Exchange Commission. 
The overall score for independence was then calculated simply by 
taking the mean of mean 1 appointments and mean 2 powers. These 
calculations resulted in a good range of scores for the dependent variable. The 
most independent institutions were found to be the broadcasting regulator 
and ART, which both scored 0.87. The least independent institution was the 
Cinema Ombudsman, which registered 0.17. The score for each institution is 
reported in Table 2. 
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Table 2 about here. 
 
 
EXPLAINING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE 
 
In the introductory section, three competing arguments were presented to 
explain why political actors might wish to delegate decision-making authority 
to non-majoritarian institutions: to establish a credible commitment; to 
insulate policy choices from opponents in the context of political uncertainty; 
and to address the problem of policy complexity. What is more, two versions 
of the credible commitment argument were identified: the decision to 
delegate may be required in the context of market opening, or as a function of 
the number of veto players in the system. Thus, four hypotheses were 
identified that might explain the varying degree of independence that has 
been granted to AAIs in the French case. Let us now test these hypotheses. We 
do so by identifying five explanatory variables and by applying a multiple 
regression analysis. 
The first explanatory variable aims to test the first element of the 
credible-commitments hypothesis, namely that the degree of independence 
will be greater in policy sectors that have been subject to market opening. In 
order to test this hypothesis we identified the institutions that had been 
established to regulate newly privatized or marketized policy areas. To this 
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end, we decided to take the institutions identified in a recent book on 
financial and economic AAIs.xxix This meant that the following institutions 
were included in the category of market-opening AAIs for the purposes of 
our study: the Competition Council, The Stock Exchange Commission, the 
Banking Commission, the Committee for Credit Establishments and 
Investment Firms, the Insurance Control Commission, the Commission for 
the Control of Mutual and Provident Institutions, the broadcasting, 
telecommunications and electricity regulators, the Commission for 
Shareholding and Share Transfers, the Commission for Consumer Safety, and 
the National Commission for Commercial Building. 
 The second explanatory variable aims to test the second element of the 
credible-commitments hypothesis, namely that the degree of independence 
will be greater in cases where the number of veto players is small. In one 
sense, this variable is extremely straightforward to operationalize. This is 
because George Tsebelis has calculated the number of veto players for each 
government during the Fourth and Fifth French Republics. (See 
http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/tsebelis/). For each AAI, we entered the veto-
players score for the government in power at the time when the AAI was 
established. So, for example, the Higher Council for Broadcasting was set up 
during the government of Michel Rocard from 1988-91. According to 
Tsebelis’s calculations, there was one veto player during this period. So, a 
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score of one was recorded for the broadcasting regulator. The veto-players 
scores for each AAI are set out in Table 2. 
 The third explanatory variable also aims to test the veto-players 
element of the credible-commitments hypothesis. While the veto-players 
variable may at first sight seem straightforward, it might be argued that 
Tsebelis’s data constitute an inappropriate measure for veto players in the 
case of AAIs. This is because these data are designed to capture the general 
features of political systems, such as the number of political parties, policy 
distance, the political composition of the coalition and so forth. These data 
may suit cross-national macro- or meso-level studies very well. However, 
they may not be so relevant to the study of one set of government agencies in 
one particular country. Therefore, we decided to identify another variable to 
test the veto-players element of the credible-commitments hypothesis. To this 
end, we focused on corporatism. To the extent that all AAIs will be concerned 
with public policy in one form or another, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
political actors may have been motivated by extent to which a particular 
policy area is associated with corporatist-like arrangements. Huber and 
Shipan have also focused on corporatism as a proxy for veto players.xxx 
Following the general logic of the veto-players argument, there should be an 
inverse relationship between the legislature’s perception that there are 
private-sector veto players operating within the policy area in question and 
the degree of independence granted to AAIs. For example, the higher the 
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level of private-sector actors on the board and, hence, the higher the number 
of veto players, the less need there is for AAIs to be independent in order to 
ensure a credible commitment. 
This variable was operationalized by calculating the percentage of non-
state actors on the governing council of the various AAIs. These actors 
include representatives of interest groups, professional associations, private 
companies, trades unions, employees’ organisations and so forth. In some 
cases, the presence of non-state actors is clearly indicated. For example, some 
AAIs, such as the Financial Markets Council, make explicit reference to the 
appointment of ‘representatives’ of particular institutions or groups of people. 
So, the 16-member board includes six members representing financial 
intermediaries (two from investment companies and four from the banks), 
one member representing the trading markets’ intermediaries, three members 
representing the issuers of listed financial instruments, and three people 
representing investors. Equally, the boards of some AAIs, among them the 
Commission for Consumer Safety, include appointees who are ‘members’ of 
equivalent organisations, or people chosen by such institutions. Here, the 16-
member governing council includes three people chosen by the members of 
the national consumer organisations and three by the national professional 
organisations in this area. 
In other cases, the situation was less clear-cut. For example, appointees 
who are members of the Economic and Social Council (Conseil économique et 
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social) are counted as non-state actors because, by and large, the Council is a 
corporatist body. However, when the President of the Economic and Social 
Council makes an appointment, then the appointee is not counted as a 
corporatist appointment because the President has the power to appoint 
whomsoever s/he wishes. This is the case for the Stock Exchange Commission. 
Equally, when a Minister chooses someone from a list of people drawn up by 
a representative institution, as in the case of the Commission for Consumer 
Safety, then this was considered to be a corporatist appointment. This is 
because the Minister’s room for manoeuvre is very small. By contrast, and 
consistent with the logic of the ‘complexity’ variable below, when the law 
states that a person is appointed ‘on the advice of’ a representative institution, 
or if such an institution merely ‘proposes’ the name of an appointee to the 
Minister, then this was not considered to be a corporatist appointment 
because the Minister has free rein to ignore any such advice or proposals. The 
‘corporatism’ scores are given in Table 2 below. 
 The fourth explanatory variable is called the ‘political uncertainty’ 
variable. Earlier, it was hypothesized that the degree of independence granted 
to non-majoritarian institutions will be greater when the level of political 
uncertainty is high. In their comparative study, Huber and Shipan 
operationalize political uncertainty by taking the average duration of cabinets 
on a country-by-country basis. Obviously, this approach is not appropriate in 
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the case of a single-country study. As a result, we operationalized this 
variable by developing an ‘index of political uncertainty’. 
The uncertainty index was calculated only for AAIs created during the 
Fifth Republic. In our opinion, it is impossible to come up with a measure of 
uncertainty that is meaningful across the very different constitutional and 
party-political contexts of the Fourth and Fifth Republics. So, for the Parity 
Commission for Publications and Press Agencies and the Higher Council of 
Agence France Press we have simply entered the mean score from the other 
31 AAIs.  The uncertainty index is composed of three separate measures. 
Firstly, we calculated the number of days from the date of the creation of the 
AAI until the next mandatory presidential or parliamentary election: the 
fewer the days, the greater the level of uncertainty, as the prospect of the 
incumbent government being replaced by a challenger increases. Secondly, 
we calculated the number of actual presidential and parliamentary elections 
per annum for the ten years before the foundation of the AAI: the greater the 
number of elections, the greater the level of uncertainty. This measure was 
included to account for the fact that elections do not always take place when 
they are meant to do so. For example, in 1997 President Chirac dissolved the 
National Assembly a full year before the scheduled election was due to take 
place. (We did not extend these calculations back into the Fourth Republic, so 
the figure is calculated on the basis of shorter periods for the National 
Commission for the Control of the Presidential Election Campaign. Thirdly, 
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we calculated the likelihood of the left and right alternating in power over the 
ten years prior of the creation of the AAI: the greater the likelihood of 
alternation, the greater the uncertainty. We did so by calculating the mean of 
the percentage of presidential and parliamentary alternations during this 
period. For the purposes of this measure, we assumed that there were 
alternations in power in 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1997 and 2002. (The same 
caveat regarding the above institution applies). Finally, the three measures 
were standardized and added together. The scores for this indicator are 
recorded in Table 2 below. 
 To illustrate how the index works, let us take the example of the 
telecommunications regulator, ART. In terms of the first element of this 
indicator, ART was founded on the 26 July 1996. A parliamentary election had 
last been held on the 21 March 1993 and a presidential election on the 24 April 
1995. Therefore, a parliamentary election was due first, at the latest on the 21 
March 1998. So, there were 604 days until the next constitutionally-mandated 
election. This number of days was 0.57 standard deviations below the mean 
for the sample of 33 AAIs. (The sign on this figure is reversed because fewer 
days mean more uncertainty). In terms of the second element, there had been 
four actual elections in the ten years prior to the foundation of the ART. 
Parliamentary elections had been held on the 5 June 1988 and the 21 March 
1993. Presidential elections had been held on the 23 April 1995 and the 24 
April 1988. This figure is 0.22 standard deviations below the mean. In terms of 
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the third element, both of the above parliamentary elections and in the 1995, 
but not the 1988, presidential election, there had been alternations in power 
between left and right. Therefore, the probability of an alternation is 0.75, 
which is 0.42 standard deviations above the mean. Adding the three together 
(0.56 – 0.22 + 0.42) provides the ART’s uncertainty score of 0.77. 
The final explanatory variable is called the ‘complexity’ variable. This 
variable aims to test the hypothesis that the degree of independence will be 
greater when the level of policy complexity is high. It is based on the idea that 
the degree of core executive control will be less extensive in issue areas that 
are more complex, or technical. Here, the degree of issue complexity is 
associated with the notion of ‘expertise’: the greater the issue complexity, the 
greater the need for policy experts. 
 The legislative perception of policy complexity can be established by 
calculating the percentage of people with policy-specific qualifications who sit 
on the governing council of each AAI. In some cases, such as the National 
Commission for Information and Civil Liberties, the legislation explicitly 
states that a number of “qualified” people must be appointed. In this case, the 
governing council includes two people qualified for their knowledge of the 
application of information technology. In other cases, such as the Insurance 
Control Commission, there is mention of the need for people to be chosen 
“because of their experience” in a certain area, in this case “insurance and 
financial matters”. Thus, any time when mention is made of the need for 
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“competence”, “experience”, or “qualifications”, the appointee is classed as 
an ‘expert’. 
In most cases, this logic allows the percentage of experts to be 
calculated for each AAI very easily. That said, as with the corporatism 
variable above, one difficult matter needs to be addressed. In some cases, 
decision makers may have decided that a representative of a particular 
organisation should be included because that organisation is the undisputed 
expert body in the area in question. In this case, there may be no explicit 
mention of any required qualification or competence, because any such 
mention might be considered superfluous. An example in this regard may be 
the National Commission for Campaign Finance and Political Contributions. 
This body oversees the declaration of political donations by elected 
representatives. In this case, the fact that three members of the Court of 
Accounts (Cour des comptes) are included on the governing council of the body 
is hardly a coincidence. After all, the Court of Accounts is the highest public-
sector auditing institution in the land. Even so, in this study, the three 
members of the Court of Accounts on the governing council of the National 
Commission for Campaign Finance and Political Contributions are not 
classed as ‘experts’. There are two reasons for this decision in both the case of 
the National Commission for Campaign Finance and Political Contributions 
and more generally. Firstly, it would be impossible to try to second-guess 
decision makers and judge whether or not someone from, say, the Court of 
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Accounts was included on a governing council for reasons of expertise or for 
another reason entirely. Secondly, on various occasions, even when someone 
from the Court of Accounts, or a similar body, is included on a governing 
council, there are other appointees of whom it is explicitly required that they 
have demonstrated competences or expertise in the area concerned. In other 
words, the presence of someone from what might be considered to be an 
‘inherently expert’ body does not mean that the legislation will not require the 
appointment of other people who are explicitly classed as ‘suitably-qualified’. 
For both reasons, therefore, an appointee is only recorded as an ‘expert’ when 
there is an explicit reference made to the need for an appointee to have 
specific “competences”, “experience”, or “qualifications” in a particular 
domain. The ‘expertise’ scores for all AAIs are provided in Table Two below. 
We tested the hypotheses by means of an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression.  A dependent variable which is a proportion may be inappropriate 
for OLS regression. However, if the dependent variable is appropriately 
transformed an OLS model is unproblematic. Since our dependent variable is 
effectively a proportion, we performed a logit transformation before 
estimating the OLS regression model. The disadvantage of this procedure is 
that predicted scores on our index of independence cannot be computed by 
merely multiplying concrete values of the independent variables by the 
regression coefficients. Fortunately, this is not necessary for the theoretical 
purposes of the paper. Rather than demanding exact predictions, we only 
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seek to assess whether independent variables are influential and in what 
direction. 
The regression produces a useful model.xxxi Its R
2
 is 0.36 and the model 
is significant at the one per cent level. The uncertainty, veto players and 
corporatism variables do not approach statistical significance. The issue area 
variable is significant at the one per cent level and the expertise variable at the 
ten per cent level. Both variables affect the level of independence in the 
manner hypothesized. The level of independence is much greater for 
regulatory as opposed to non-regulatory agencies. Agency independence also 
increases with the level of legislative perception for the need for expert board 
members. The effect of issue area is considerably more substantial than that of 
expertise. The results of the model are set out in Table Three. 
Table 3 about here. 
These findings raise the question of why the veto players and 
uncertainty hypotheses fail to make any impact on the independence of AAIs. 
In other words, why is it that some elements of the existing literature were 
found to be robust, whereas others were not. One plausible explanation is that 
the veto players and uncertainty arguments are only relevant when the AAIs 
are politically salient. Arguably, politicians are likely to be much more 
concerned about the numbers of veto players and the level of political 
uncertainty when the issue in question is directly related to electoral 
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competition. However, when the area is politically insignificant, then these 
factors are less important. In order to explore this idea, we investigated the 
coverage that AAIs receive in France’s most well-known quality newspapers. 
Based on the assumption that the issues, which are important to electoral 
competition are likely to receive relatively high coverage in the media, we 
calculated the political salience of the various AAIs. 
In the French case, the most tractable media source is the press. This is 
because the three most well-known daily national newspapers, Le Figaro, 
Libération and Le Monde, have on-line archives. Of these three sources, Le 
Figaro supports the right, Libération supports the left, while Le Monde, 
although left-leaning, is the newspaper of repute. Moreover, the correlation 
between the number of AAI-related articles in Le Monde and the other two 
newspapers was found to be extremely high. For these reasons, Le Monde can 
be treated as the most independent media source available. The political 
salience variable was measured by recording each occasion when the name of 
an AAI was mentioned in the headline of a Le Monde article by calculating the 
average number of words per month. The time period goes from 1 January 
1987, the starting date for the on-line Le Monde archive, to 31 October 2002. In 
the cases where AAIs were created after 1 January 1987, the time period 
comprises the number of months from the time of the institution’s creation to 
31 October 2002. 
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According to our measure, only two AAIs even approached political 
salience. Articles mentioning the Higher Council for Broadcasting and 
politicians averaged 209 words per month, while the next highest score was 
for the National Commission for Information and Civil Liberties with only 
forty six words per month. The broadcasting regulator has the joint highest 
level of independence, while the National Commission for Information and 
Civil Liberties is also highly independent. Excluding these two institutions, 
the mean visibility of the other thirty-one AAIs was only 4.4 words per 
month. Politicians are hardly interested in this level of coverage. This 
provides a persuasive, if inconclusive, explanation for the weakness of the 
uncertainty and veto players variables in our model. A more thorough 
investigation of this explanation would require a model that included 
interaction terms between salience and uncertainty and veto players. 
Unfortunately, in our data this would have made little sense, since we have 
only two salient cases. Once we had put them in our model, we would have 
had to take them out again to avoid suggesting that a relationship driven by 
two cases applies to our sample as a whole.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has examined the motivations of political actors at the point of 
delegation? In particular, it has examined the issue of why a greater degree of 
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independence is granted to some institutions rather than others. In the 
existing literature, various explanations, mainly derived from US case studies, 
have suggested why this may be the case. We tested these explanations in the 
case of Independent Administrative Authorities in France. We found that the 
degree of independence is much greater for regulatory as opposed to non-
regulatory agencies and that agency independence also increases with the 
level of the perceived need for expert board members. These findings are 
significant and for three reasons. Firstly, France is a difficult test case. It is not 
an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ democracy. In particular, it has a very different political 
system from the US. In this context, the fact that various elements of the 
existing literature were found to be robust is important. The theory has 
crossed a difficult hurdle. Secondly, AAIs do not comprise a list of classic 
IRAs. They include a very varied set of institutions. Once again, therefore, the 
fact that various elements of the existing literature were found to be robust is 
also important. The literature on delegation can be extended to include a 
wider set of non-majoritarian institutions than has usually been the case. 
Thirdly, even though the veto players and uncertainty explanations were not 
found to be convincing, this may be a function of the low level of electoral 
salience associated with many AAIs. In other words, there may be two 
different theories of delegation: one for politically salient decisions and one 
for those which are ‘under the radar’ of electorally-sensitive politicians. We 
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provide some evidence to back up this argument, but it needs to be tested 
more fully. Therefore, we establish an agenda for future research in this area. 
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Table 1 Independent Administrative Authorities in France 
 
1.  Commission nationale de 
l’information et des libertés 
National Commission for 
Information and Civil 
Liberties 
CNIL 
2. Médiateur de la République Ombudsman Mediator 
3. Comité national d'évaluation National Evaluation 
Committee 
CNE 
4. Conseil Supérieur de 
l’Audiovisuel 
Higher Council for 
Broadcasting 
CSA 
5. Commission nationale des 
comptes de campagne et des 
financements politiques 
National Commission for 
Campaign Finance and 
Political Contributions 
CNCCFP 
6. Commission nationale de 
contrôle des interceptions de 
sécurité 
National Committee for the 
Control of Telephone Tapping 
CNCIS 
7. Commission des Opérations de 
Bourse 
Stock Exchange Commission COB 
8. Autorité de régulation des 
télécommunications 
Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority 
ART 
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9. Commission consultative du 
secret de la défense nationale 
Consultative Committee on 
National Defence 
Confidentiality 
CCSDN 
10. Le conseil de prévention et de 
lutte contre le dopage 
Council for the Prevention 
and the Fight against Doping 
CPLD 
11. Autorité de contrôle des 
nuisances sonores aéroportuaires 
Authority for the Control of 
Airport Noise 
ACNUS
A 
12. Le Défenseur des enfants Children’s Ombudsman Child 
13. Commission nationale de 
déontologie de la sécurité 
National Ethical Commission 
for Law and Order 
CNDS 
14. La commission centrale 
permanente compétente pour 
fixer les éléments à retenir pour le 
calcul du bénéfice agricole 
Commission relating to 
Earnings from Agriculture 
Agric. 
15. La commission paritaire des 
publications et agences de presse 
Parity Commission for 
Publications and Press 
Agencies 
CPPAP 
16. Le conseil supérieur de 
l'Agence France Presse 
Higher Council of the Agence 
France Press 
CSAFP 
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17. La Commission nationale de 
contrôle de la campagne électorale 
relative à l'élection du Président 
de la République 
National Commission for the 
Control of the Presidential 
Election Campaign 
CNCCE
P 
18. La commission des sondages Opinion Poll Commission Sondage
s 
19. La commission des infractions 
fiscales 
Commission for Tax 
Violations 
CIF 
20. Le bureau central de 
tarification 
Central Rating Office BCT 
21. Le médiateur du cinéma Cinema Ombudsman Cinema 
22. La commission bancaire Banking Commission CB 
23. Le comité des établissements 
de crédit et des entreprises 
d'investissement 
Committee for Credit 
Institutions and Investment 
Firms 
CECEI 
24. Commission des participations 
et des transferts 
Commission for Acquisitions 
and Transfers 
 
CPT 
25. Conseil de la concurrence Competition Council CC 
26. La Commission de contrôle 
des assurances 
Insurance Control 
Commission 
CCA 
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27. La commission de contrôle des 
mutuelles et des institutions de 
prévoyance 
Commission for the Control 
of Mutual and Provident 
Institutions 
CCMIP 
28. La Commission nationale 
d'équipement commercial 
National Commission for 
Commercial Building 
CNEC 
29. Le conseil de discipline de la 
gestion financière 
Disciplinary Council for 
Financial Management 
CDGF 
30. Commission de régulation de 
l’électricité 
Electricity Regulatory 
Commission 
CRE 
31. Commission d’accès aux 
documents administratifs 
Commission for Access to 
Administrative Documents 
CADA 
32. Commission de la sécurité des 
consommateurs 
Commission for Consumer 
Safety 
CSC 
33. La Commission pour la 
transparence financière de la vie 
politique 
Commission for the Financial 
Openness of Political Life 
CTFVP 
34. Conseil des marchés financiers Financial Markets Council CMF 
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Table 2 Scores for Independent Administrative Authorities in France 
 
 
Indepe-
ndence 
Regu-
lation 
Exp-
ertise 
Veto-
Players 
Corp-
oratism 
Uncert-
ainty 
Salience 
CNIL .68 0 29.4 2 11.8 -.67 45.8 
Médiateur .35 0 0 3 0 -.67 16.1 
CNE .51 0 16 1 76 .12 0 
CSA .87 1 0 1 0 .12 209.2 
CNCCFP .45 0 0 1 0 .12 9.2 
CNCIS .57 0 .0 1 0 -.14 14.1 
COB .75 1 30 2 10 .12 2.2 
ART .87 1 0 2 0 .12 9.4 
CCSDN .47 0 0 5 0 .38 13.5 
CPLD .74 0 66.7 5 0 .38 0 
ACNUSA .72 0 100 5 0 .38 1.8 
Children .25 0 0 5 0 .38 17.9 
CNDS .50 0 25 5 0 .38 4.2 
CPPAP .34 0 0 4 47.6 0 0 
CSAFP .24 0 0 3 50 0 0 
CNCCEP .28 0 0 2 0 .12 6.6 
Sondages .60 0 18.2 4 0 -.67 0 
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CIF .30 0 0 4 0 -.67 0 
BCT .24 0 0 2 90 .21 0 
Cinema .17 0 0 2 0 -.23 0 
CB .56 1 33.3 2 0 .12 10.2 
CECEI .32 1 15.4 2 30.8 .12 0 
CPT .40 0 100 2 0 .21 7.6 
CC .60 1 23.5 2 29.4 .21 18.5 
CCA .72 1 40 1 0 .12 0 
CCMIP .62 1 40 1 20 .12 0 
CNEC .44 0 37.5 1 0 -.14 0 
CDGF .31 0 0 2 11.1 -.14 0 
CRE .72 1 100 5 0 .38 0 
CADA .34 0 0 2 0 -.67 0 
CSC .41 0 37.5 2 75 -.23 0 
CTFVP .39 0 0 2 0 .03 5.5 
CMF .54 1 12.5 2 87.5 .12 0 
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Table 3 Regression Model: Logit of Index of Independence 
 
Variable B s.e. 
Constant -0.374 0.349 
Regulation 0.986*** 0.302 
Expertise 0.00821* 0.005 
Uncertainty -0.02576 0.43 
Veto Players -0.00509 0.101 
Private Sector -0.00643 0.005 
Adjusted R² 0.36 
F 4.603*** 
N 33 
Notes: Model is Ordinary Least Squares; *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant 
at 5%, * significant at 10% 
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